AI PAYMENT THREAT · PAYMENT PROMPT INJECTION

Contain prompt injection at the payment boundary

Prompt injection cannot change a hard amount, merchant, consent or expiry rule evaluated outside the agent.

Where the failure appears

A page or tool can tell an agent to ignore earlier instructions, reveal secrets or override a budget. Model-level defenses help, but the payment boundary must assume upstream compromise is possible.

Who needs the control

Teams connecting language models to browsers, tools, checkout APIs, wallets or purchasing workflows.

Execution-time response

  1. Treat external page and tool text as untrusted.
  2. Send only normalized payment facts and mandate boundaries.
  3. Flag common instruction-override patterns for review or blocking.
  4. Enforce hard policy regardless of model output.

Relevant controls

Instruction-override signalsDeterministic amount checksMerchant scope enforcementConsent evidenceShort authorization windowsMinimal input surface

What changes

Even a manipulated agent cannot make the policy engine reinterpret the user's payment authority.

AI agent builder solution →Security model →

Reproduce the failure safely

Change a sample amount, seller, consent field or instruction and inspect the structured decision before integrating.

Test the threat free →